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Report of the CGIAR 
Working Group on 
Deliberation and Decision Making’ 
The CGIAR was established in 1971 because donors shared a common value in supporting 
international agricultural research. It has since proven its value as a forum for consultation among donors 
and for mobilizing financial support for international agricultural research. In 1972 the six CGIAR 
members supported 4 centers with grants of approximately $25 million. Today 41 donors contribute 
about $300 million annually to 18 agricultural and resource research institutions serving the developing 
world. 
After a period of rapid growth from 1971 to 1982, the CGIAR remained remarkable stable until 
1989. A recent decision to include an additional 5 research centers in the CGIAR unfortunately coincided 
with a period of budgetary stringency in donor agencies, leading to challenges in the management of the 
Group. The Chairman of.the CGIAR invited some 25 individuals to an informal consultation in London 
in January 1992 to discuss a broad range of issues facing the CGIAR. Following a report by Walter 
Falcon, the moderator of the London consultation, at the Group’s mid-term meeting in Istanbul in May 
1992, the Chairman appointed a five person Working Group with the following terms of reference: 
To identify the strengths and weaknesses of the CGIAR’s current deliberation and 
decision making processes, taking into account the views expressed most recently at the 
mid-term meeting in Istanbul and the consultation in London, and to develop options for 
improving these processes. 
In consultation with other members of the CGIAR, the centers, and other actors, make 
recommendations to the CGIAR Chairman for the organization and conduct of ICW92 
by September 15, 1992. 
Prior to ICW92 the Working Group recommended that a day be spent during ICW92 discussing 
international agricultural research needs and means in three parallel sessions. A summary of reactions 
of the CGIAR to that experiment is contained in this report. 
The Working Group provided preliminary ideas and suggestions on the CGIAR’s deliberation and 
decision making to ICW92, and following that meeting sent a questionnaire to all CGIAR members, 
inviting comments on the parallel sessions experiment and suggestions for improving deliberation and 
decision making. A summary of the results of that survey is attached’. The Working Group prepared 
the present report after discussions held on March 17-18, 1993, drawing on inputs it received from 
members of the CGIAR community, the results of the questionnaire, and their personal observations. 
’ The Working Group was appointed by the CGIAR Chairman in May, 1992. It is chaired by Robert W. Herdt, and has the 
following members: Manoel Malheiros-Tourinho, Wilhelm Suden, Eugene Terry, and Klaus Wiiel. Selquk &gediz is the CCIAR 
Secretariat member. 
* See: Strengths and Weaknesses of the CGIAR’s Deliberation and Decision Making Processes -- Results from a Questionnaire 
Survey of CGIAR Members and Center 
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Following this introductory section, this report briefly summarizes the current structure, functions 
and defining characteristics of the CGIAR, outlines the challenges to the Group’s effective functioning, 
and presents a number of recommendations to address the challenges. 
In brief, the Working Group recommends: 
1. That the. CGIAR conrinue its “two meetings a year” format, but provide a separate general 
foci to the ICW and the MlM, such as devoting the ICW to more system-wide issues and the MTM to 
center-specific issues. 
2. That parallel sessions be used at future ICWs as appropriate, ana’ that the designers of the 
future parallel sessions take fill account of the criticisms, which are documented in the survey of CGIAR 
members. 
3. ‘Ihat mid term meetings be held in countries where CGIAR centers are located, to the extent 
that the national agricultural research authorities and center authorities can manage such events in a 
practical way. 
4. ?hat discussion procedures at the mid-term meeting and at center’s week be streamlined. 
5. 7hat the donor members of the CGIAR establish a standing committee on finance from their 
own membership, with terms of reference specified in the body of this report. 
6. That a 5-person CGIAR standing committee on system-level evaluation be established, with 
terms of reference specified in the body of this report, and that the CGIAR Chairman appoint ad hoc 
working groups made up of CGIAR members on each review scheduled for consideration by the CGIAR. 
7. That, when significant sh@s in strategy and priorities are envisioned, the CGZAR Chairman 
establish an ad hoc working group to consider UC’s recommendations. 
8. That the Directors General, the Public Awareness Association, the Secretariat, and key 
national support groups jointly decide on a single mechanism for CGIAR public awareness work, to 
ensure leadership, coordination, and eflcient use of public awareness resources. 
9. 7har appoinhnent of ad hoc working groups follow an approach which systematically aims 
toward the type of objectives specified in the body of this report. 
10. That the CGIAR and the centers explore the possibility of using a regional roundtable format 
more systematically for reflecting views of developing country agricultural researchers within the CGIAR. 
Structure, Functions and Defininp Characteristics 
Structure. The CGIAR is not a legal entity; it is an informal consultative group and conducts its 
business in a remarkably unstructured way, with a minimal “governance structure,” as it has since its 
founding. The notable change has been the addition of more people to each of the several constituent 
bodies that, taken together, make up the CGIAR. These are: 
3 
- Twice yearly meetings of CGIAR donors and developing country representatives; 
- The CGIAR Chairman, a World Bank vice president; 
- The Co-sponsors of the CGIAR: The World Bank, UNDP and FAO; 
- The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and its chair; 
- The secretariat of the CGIAR (whose staff are World Bank employees); 
- The secretariat of TAC (whose staff are FAO employees); and, 
- The international agricultural research centers. 
The CGIAR’s decision making process essentially consists of meeting as a “committee of the 
whole,” hearing-reports, discussing issues, and then listening to the Chairman articuIate “a consensus.” 
In recent years the “whole” has reached 200 or so people. 
Donors to the CGIAR include bilateral and multilateral development assistance agencies, 
development banks, developing nations, and foundations. In addition to developing country donor 
members, the FAO regional meetings select 10 “fixed term representatives” to the CGIAR. 
Donors each decide the amount of funding they will provide to each center. The World Bank 
decides the amount of funding it will supply to the system. The Bank’s funds are used, to the extent 
available, to ensure that each center receives the same proportion of its TAC recommended and CGIAR 
approved budget level. Thus, there is a clear benefit to the centers in belonging to the system because 
there is a mechanism for at least partially closing their funding gaps resulting from year to year variations 
in financial support from individual donors. 
TAC formulates recommendations to the CGIAR on major program issues, including modifying 
the set of centers in the system, strategies and priorities, centers’ programs, and resource allocation. As 
part of its responsibility to, ensure relevant, high quality programs, TAC commissions external program 
reviews of centers. 
TAC is supported by a secretariat, headquartered at FAO in Rome. The TAC Secretariat, headed 
by an Executive Secretary, organizes the meetings of TAC and provides staff functions to TAC. 
The CGIAR Secretariat, also headed by an Executive Secretary, organizes the meetings of the 
CGIAR and related bodies, maintains communications among members and centers, provides information 
and other services to donors, centers and the public, organizes periodic external management reviews of 
the centers in the system, and supports the CGIAR Chairman and the Co-Sponsors in their dealings with 
the CGIAR. The CGIAR Secretariat members are headquartered at the World Bank in Washington D.C. 
Each research center is an independent, autonomous, international entity. Each has. an 
independent board which is self-perpetuating. The CGIAR nominates or appoints members to boards of 
the centers, numbering between three and eight. 
Functions. Included in the CGIAR’s broad information-sharing and decision making activities 
are four specific functions: 
1. Consultation on international agricultural research needs, including discussion of issues and 
agreeing on goals and strategies for the CGIAR. 
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2. Setting CGIAR policy, including program, financial, institutional management, governance 
policy, and allocation of available resources. 
3. Financing international agricultural research activities, including constituency building and 
fund raising. 
4. Evaluation of activities that are funded, including evaluation of institutions, programs, and 
of the System. 
Defining Characteristics. Four defining characteristics, each having high.value to the CGIAR 
community, undergird the CGIAR and make it different from other international organizations. These 
are: independent centers, autonomous donors, independent technical advice, and consensus decision 
making. 
Each center has its own legal personality, is controlled by an independent board of trustees, and 
is not a sub-unit of some other org,anization. That is, a CGIAR center is not like an Institute of 
Development Studies which is a unit of a university, or like the Development Assistance Committee 
which is a unit of OECD, or like a ministry research department which is a unit of a government. As 
a consequence, centers are free to follow the best course to achieve their goals, constrained by the 
funding available to them. 
Donors are autonomous because each can decide which centers in the system will receive its 
funds, and in what amount. Through “restricted core donations” donors can decide what programs of 
centers they will support, and through “special project” funding they can entice centers to take on 
activities in addition to what centers might otherwise do. There is no pooling of donor funds, and no 
treaty obligation for donors to provide funding to centers. Most industrialized countries are represented 
in the CGIAR by officials from development assistance agencies, while multilateral agencies and 
foundations are represented by agricultural specialists, and developing country members are generally 
represented by officials from ministries of agriculture. 
Independent technical advice is provided by TAC to the CGIAR. The TAC Chairman and 
members are drawn from the global community of agricultural researchers outside the system: they are 
independent of centers and donors, most are faculty members of leading agricultural universities or 
research institutions. 
The international centers in the system have been included through consensus decisions arrived 
at after considering the technical advice of TAC. The CGIAR has always held technical considerations 
-- research goals, research quality, likelihood of success, research target, effectiveness - as paramount, 
although all recognize that elements of political reality also influence the decisions that are made, 
Consensus decision making is probably the most highly held value of the CGIAR. Decision 
making is influenced not by amount of funding a contributor makes, but rather by the appropriateness 
and soundness of thought and opinion of the contributor. Issues are discussed, opinions expressed, and 
views aired until the chairman believes there is a consensus to proceed in a particular direction. If there 
is no objection to his statement of a consensus, then a decision has been made. 
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Challenges to Information Sharing. Deliberation 
4nd 
Donors are, by and Iarge, satisfied with the performance of individual centers, safeguarded by 
the internal and external review system. Besides the reviews, direct links between donors and centers 
allow for donor insight and influence. Of course, continuous improvement and response to changing 
conditions are needed, which requires close oversight by TAC and the donors. 
CGIAR information-sharing functioned well during the growth years of 1971 to 1985. However, 
over time, and increasingly during the past five years, there has been increasing concern with the process 
and content of meetings. Some of the most serious strains seem to arise from: 
0 an increase in number of donor members -- a positive development but one which 
constrains the Group’s ability to carry on its business as it previously had; 
0 an increase in number of centers, leading to challenges in financing them and in 
organizing, conducting, presenting, and properly considering program and management 
reviews; 
0 an increase in the diversity of goals that stakeholders have for the work of the centers; 
0 a decline (in real terms) of financial contributions to the CGIAR system since 1990; 
0 the need for CGIAR donors and centers alike to better understand the needs of 
developing country agriculture; and 
0 an increased concern to ensure that the needs for agricultural research and views of the 
developing countries -- the intended beneficiaries in the system -- are clearly heard by the 
CGIAR. 
The CGIAR meets each October-November in Washington, D.C. at International Center’s Week 
(ICW) and in a different place in May, at the Mid-Term Meeting @TM). ICW originally was an 
oppo’rtunity for each center director to report‘to the donors on the year’s activity, and the MTM has been 
considered more of a donor’s meeting with only those centers specifically scheduled for evaluation or 
other roles expected to attend. However, in reality both meetings are large and long, and encourage too 
many to remain in the role of passive listeners. The size and structure of the meetings mean that the 
center directors and other scientists who attend are not expected to contribute to the discussions except 
when there are specific questions asked of them. Many think this would seem to under-utilize the brains 
of some of the best informed indivi,duals attending. 
There have also been evident difficulties in making decisions as the system and its components 
have grown. During the past several years the CGIAR has struggled to resolve questions such as: 
0 Should new centers come under the Group’s consultative and funding process? 
0 Should the group initiate a new category of activities, such as in forestry? 
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0 How should the group react to internal crises at centers which are not adequately 
managed by Boards? 
0 How can the Group interact with the World Bank in the appointment of a Chairman? 
0 How should available funds be allocated when they fall short of approved budgets? and, 
0 How can the CGIAR reverse the declines in funding for the system? 
Handling all the business of the CGIAR in plenary meetings is inefficient. Most donors wish to 
have greater involvement with CGIAR decision making, and would like better ways to become informed 
about activities of the centers. Large numbers are the enemy of frank and free exchanges of views in 
meetings: only one person can speak at a time and only a limited time is available. Perhaps most 
importantly, the present procedures do not engender a sense of “ownership” among the donors. 
Recommendations 
The Working Group makes several suggestions and recommendations for greater information 
sharing among all stakeholders (donors, centers, and developing country agricultural researchers), and 
clearer responsibility for decision making by those who must, in the end, provide the funds. The 
Working Group has reached its recommendations after considering several options, including the initial 
set considered at ICW92, those listed in the questionnaire survey, and the suggestions made by a large. 
number of individuals 
Information Sharirw and Deliberations 
CGTAR Meetiws. Respondents to the survey expressed strong disappointment in the one-day 
parallel sessions held at ICW92. The experiment was criticized for being inadequately focused, 
dominated by economists, and dealing with issues of too little operational significance to the CGIAR. 
There was, nonetheless, broad support for using parallel sessions in the future to consider substantive 
issues of special concern to the CGIAR, such as intellectual propez-ty rights, ecoregional research, and 
financial practices of CG centers. The Working Group recommends that parallel sessions be used at 
future ICWs as appropriate, and that the designers of the future parallel sessions take full account of the 
criticisms, which are documented in the survey summary. 
The survey of CGIAR members and centers indicated broad support for having a somewhat 
different focus to ICW and the MTM. Over 80 percent of the respondents supported devoting part of 
future ICWs to global thinking and consideration of system-wide issues. Annual budgets have to be 
approved. Perspective planning and long-term considerations shouId be featured. Many observers attend, 
at least during the first few days, creating an opportunity to share thinking, possibly in parallel sessions. 
ICW might feature a global forum on natural resources and agriculture to which the public and media 
may be invited. 
The working group recommends that the CGIAR continue its “two meetings a year” format, but 
provide a separate general foci to the ICW and the MTM, such as devoting the ICW to more system-wide 
issues and the MTM to center-specific issues. 
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The mid-term meetings could be reserved primarily for retrospective consideration of center 
programs (reviews) and centers’ interactions with developing country research systems. MTMs are held 
in a different country each year, in response to invitations received from delegations. This provides an 
opportunity for those attending to become somewhat famihar with some host country agricuIturaI features. 
A few mid-term meetings have been held in developing countries. Many centers organize “field days,” 
or other events for donors and national agricultural researchers. One could envision mid-term meetings 
being built around such activities, with larger centers hosting smaller neighbors for regional meetings 
which would have time added for evaluation reports on program and management reviews and other CG 
business. Donor agency staff with primarily a regional responsibility might participate, along with staff 
from regional and national agricultural research organizations. Donors could arrange with local units of 
their own agencies to visit local research organizations, giving a more relevant experience than has 
typically been the case in MTMs. 
The Working Group recommends that mid term meetings be held in countries where CGIAR 
centers are located, to the extent that the national agricultural research authorities and center authorities 
can manage such events in a practical way. 
Conduct of Business. The meetings of the group consider a large number of separate items of 
business, and following each the opportunity is provided for comments from the floor. Often, especially 
early in the meetings, introductory presentations are long, comments are numerous and long, and little 
discipline is imposed on the speakers and delegates by the Chair. To increase the efficiency of the 
meetings, the Working Group recommends that: 
a. External reviews be introduced Only by the panel Chair, with written comments from the 
Center, TAC Chair, and Executive Secretary replacing the present custom of having oral 
comments by each. 
b. The time for presentations be limited and clearly stated on the daily schedule. 
C. Members be invited to indicate to the Secretariat, in writing and prior to the day of 
discussion, those items on which they wish to make extended comments. 
d. The time allowed for individual interventions from the floor by those not so indicating 
be limited by the Chair. 
e. The Chair sum up the discussion and state the conclusions and/or decisions reached at 
the end of each item. 
Chairmanshiu. The defining characteristics of the CGIAR make the role of its Chair an 
especially important one. The Chair must be able to listen and discern consensus among the members 
during discussion of business on the floor, but the Chair carries a number of other responsibilities as well. 
The Chair can deal authoritatively with Directors General and Board Chairs. The Chair is the one 
individual who can speak for the entire system, whether in discussions with potential multilateral and 
bilateral donors, or with developing country partners. The Chair carries the moral authority of the 
consensus decisions that have been reached, and personifies the system to those who come into contact 
with it. 
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Since 19i4, the CGIAR Chairman has always been a World Bank Vice President appointed to 
this post by the President of the World Bank. The Working Group is of the opinion that the practice of 
the CGIAR Chair being appointed by the President of the World Bank from among the senior managers 
of the Bank at the level of vice president or higher, after due consultation with CGIAR members, should 
be continued. It suggests that to ensure greater continuity of the chair, the President of the World Bank 
consider appointing the chair for a fixed term of say, three or four years, so that chairmanship could be 
retained by the individual so appointed even if the individual’s responsibilities in the Bank were to be 
changed, so long as the individual does not resign but remains in a senior Bank management position. 
Decision Making 
Matters requiring decisions (budgets, additional centers, etc.) requires a richer opportunity for 
discussion and deliberation than is now available. The Working Group recommends the formation of two 
CGIAR permanent committees to provide a regular, continuing forum for the consideration of finance 
and evaluation matters. These would be supplemented by ad hoc working groups to address, from time 
to time, other issues as needed. 
Finance: The normal operating procedure of the CGIAR gives scant opportunity for donors to 
consider, jointly or in depth, the budgets of individual centers and the system. Time allotted in the 
plenary is brief and, even if more time were allocated, the plenary is too large a body for meaningful 
exchange of views on budget or finance issues. This responsibility is so important that donors should 
give it their utmost direct attention. TAC, which was initially conceived as a committee to give 
programmatic advice and to ensure scientific quality, is being required to also make financial 
recommendations, a task to which it is ill suited. When funds available fall short of the total approved 
budget, as in recent years, an ad hoc committee has been appointed to deal with the shortfall. A standing 
committee is a preferable mechanism. 
The need for a donor mechanism to address finance issues, including resource allocation, has been 
proposed several times in the past. The Second Review of the CGIAR made a specific recommendation 
for a CGIAR Budget Review Committee. The present TAC Chair has repeatedly stated the need for the 
CGIAR to take responsibility. for addressing resource allocation matters. 
The working group recommends that the donor members of the CGIAR establish a standing 
committee on finance from their own membership, with the following terms of reference: 
1. To provide overall leadership for the efficient management of the Group’s finances. 
2. To consider medium-term and annual programs of work and budget requests of the 
centers and TAC’s recommendations thereon and make recommendations on the budget 
allocation for the implementation of these programs. 
3. After funding levels for a calendar year can be estimated with reasonable accuracy 
(usually by April 1), to recommend adjustments to approved budgets for each center so 
the system has a balanced budget. 
4. To consider and make recommendations on CGIAR budget policies and procedures, 
including such issues as: core vs. complementary activities and restricted vs. unrestricted 
funding; standard practices regarding cost structures, overheads, and restricted core and 
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special project proposals; judgments of center efficiency (or value-for-money); procedures 
governing the management of financial flows through the CGIAR Secretariat to centers; 
operations of the special activities fund and the stabilization fund; and practices related 
to the financial balancing mechanism (donor of last resort funds), and related topics, 
5. Consider and pursue options for mobilizing new sources of funding for the centers in 
coordination with the Public Awareness Association (PAA) and the Center Directors’ 
Public Awareness and Resource Committee (PARC). 
The standing committee should report on its findings and recommendations to the CGIAR plenary 
for approval and/or final decision. It should be assisted by the CGIAR Secretariat and cooperate with all 
other elements in the system, especially TAC. 
The Standing Committee should consist of 9 donors selected by donors; two members selected 
by and from among developing country donors, the other 7 members selected by and from among those 
donors which in the previous year had contributed the equivalent of $1.0 million or more of core 
resources to CGIAR centers. A donor representative who also serves as a member of a CGIAR center 
Board would not serve as a member of this committee. Each member should serve for three years, with 
rotation established by the committee after the first selection of members. 
The formation of a CGIAR standing committee on finance would reduce TAC’s responsibilities 
and workload in this area. This should enable TAC to concentrate on scientific and technical matters. 
However, with regard to program and budget matters, TAC should continue to: 
0 review the centers’ five-year medium term plan proposals; 
0 assess the technical and scientific relevance of centers’ programs to CGIAR priorities and 
strategies; 
0 assess the appropriateness of proposed budgets for the implementation of 5-year program 
plans; and, 
0 review, on a yearly basis, the need for adjustments, additions or reductions to the content 
and activities of centers’ annual programs of work and the corresponding budgetary 
implications. 
Evaluation. There is no focal point within the CGIAR for performing a “due diligence” function 
for the system as a whole, especially regarding managerial, non-technical aspects of its operations. There 
is also no focal point for initiating reviews of the system and ad hoc evaluations of these aspects of the 
system. Reviews of centers commissioned on behalf of the CGIAR by TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat 
are sometimes of uneven quality. Similarly, consideration of reviews by the CGIAR is sometimes 
superficial, with highly variable levels of interest expressed by the members. Review reports are often 
long, as are their presentation at CGIAR meetings. 
Both the evaluation efforts and their consideration within the system could be improved by 
establishing a small permanent evaluation committee of the CGIAR, supplemented by ad hoc working 
groups. assigned to focus on specific reviews in order to facilitate their consideration by the CGIAR. 
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Accordingly, the working group recommends the formation of a 5-person standing committee of CGIAR 
members on evaluation with the following terms of reference: 
1. On behalf of the CGIAR, to ensure that due care and diligence is exercised in the sytem’s 
and centers’ operations, so that the interests of the members of the CGIAR are protected 
against negligence or mismanagement; 
2. In close collaboration with TAC, CGIAR Secretariat and the centers, to assess the 
CGIAR’s policies and procedures for center, inter-center, ad hoc, and system reviews, 
and, when needed, recommend changes for approval by the CGIAR. 
3. From time to time, draw lessons from reviews, particularly in terms of their system-wide 
policy implications. 
4. To make recommendations to the CGIAR and, if approved, initiate ad hoc system-wide 
reviews on topics of current or emerging interest to the system. 
5. To make recommendations to the CGIAR and, if approved, initiate reviews of the 
system. 
6. To promote within the donor community the streamlining, if not the elimination or at 
least reduction, of donor initiated reviews of center operations. 
7. To maintain a “watching.brief’ on the implementation of pivotal recommendations of 
reviews. 
The working group also recommends that the CGIAR Chairman, with advice from the Evaluation 
Committee, appoint ad hoc working groups made up of CGIAR members on each review scheduled for 
consideration by the CGIAR. Such ad hoc working groups should include at least one member of the 
Evaluation Committee. The working group constituted for a specific review would be asked to consider, 
in-depth, the report and recommendations of the review team, the response from the center, TAC’s 
commentary on the review, and the CGIAR Secretariat’s comments on management, and make any 
observations that it believes is relevant and appropriate for facilitating discussion and decision by the 
CGIAR.’ A CGIAR member who also serves as a member of a CGIAR center board could serve as a 
member of ad hoc working groups, except that such a member would not participate in the discussion 
of evaluation matters relating to a center on whose board he/she serves. 
The standing committee should report on its findings and recommendations to the CGIAR plenary 
for approval and/or final decision, It should be assisted by the CGIAR Secretariat and cooperate with all 
others involved, especially TAC. 
Priorities and Strategies. Assessing’ the priorities and strategies of the system should be an 
ongoing responsibility of the whole CGIAR. The current practice of updating the data and underlying 
assumptions of the system’s strategies and priorities every five years is sound. 
TAC and the Center Directors’ Committee each have standing committees on priorities and 
strategies. TAC should continue to conduct periodic, independent appraisals of the system’s priorities 
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and strategies in consultation with the centers, and advise the Group about any significant changes that 
are called for, along with their rationale. 
The CGIAR needs to increase its capacity to consider possible changes in an efficient and 
meaningful way. To accomplish this the Working Group recommends that the CGIAR Chairman 
establish, when significant shifts in strategy and priorities are envisioned, an ad hoc working group, with 
representation from all major components of the system, including the client national programs and other 
partners, to consider TAC’s recommendations in depth and forward them to the CGIAR plenary with its 
own commentary. 
Public Awareness and Resource Mobilization. Those who know the past contributions and 
future potential of the CGIAR to forestall world hunger believe that funding of its activities should not 
be a problem. However, in spite of the relatively small amounts involved, the CGIAR has not only 
experienced drops in absolute levels of funding, but it has also seen its share of official development 
assistance fall from 0.63 percent in 1986 to 0.50 percent in 1991. The challenge to the CGIAR is to 
promote itself more effectively to the genera1 public and the relevant decision makers in donor and 
partner countries. 
Many separate, independent efforts to promote public awareness of the CGIAR centers’ activities 
exist. Each center makes such efforts. So does the CGIAR Secretariat for the system as a whole. A 
Public Awareness Association exists, consisting of information specialists from donors, centers and the 
Secretariat. The Directors General have a Public Awareness and Resource Committee (PARC). 
Organizations to encourage support of international agricultural research exist in some donor countries, 
including -Australia, India, and others. It seems to the Working Group that a greater degree of 
effectiveness could be achieved if these disparate efforts were better related to each other. 
The Working Group recommends that: 
0 the Directors General, the Public Awareness. Association, the Secretariat, and key 
national support groups jointly decide on a single mechanism for CGIAR public 
awareness work, to ensure leadership, coordination, high visibility of the CGIAR system, 
more adequate financial support, and efficient use of public awareness resources; 
0 the CGIAR provide full support and encouragement to work in this area; 
0 the public awareness and resource mobilization activities being carried out on behalf of 
the system be reported to the CGIAR from time to time for information and guidance 
from members; 
0 that each donor strengthen its activities in the public awareness area; and, 
0 that an ad hoc working group be established as deemed to be appropriate by the 
Evaluation Committee to assess the adequacy of the system’s public awareness activities. 
Nominations. The Working Group examined in broad terms the CGIAR’s current processes for 
nominating and or selecting members for five groups: TAC, CGIAR-nominees on center boards, external 
review panels, ad hoc working groups, and representatives from developing countries. The processes used 
for each are different. 
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To aid the nomination process for many of these posts, the CG Secretariat administers a 
Candidate Information Service (CIS), which includes a data base of names and resumes of individuals 
whose suitability for various roles has been evaluated by a small panel. CIS is used primarily in 
identifying candidates for TAC, center boards, and program and management review panels. The 
Secretariat is commended for its efforts in building the CIS and is‘encouraged to continue its efforts to 
increase the number of high quality potential candidates in the system. Donors are encouraged to submit 
names of potential candidates for inclusion in the CIS. 
TAC members. The Co-Sponsors nominate the chairman and members of TAC after 
consideration of potential candidates. The Working Group recognizes the efforts being made to 
ensure that TAC nominees meet high standards of quality and relevance and does not see a need 
for a change in the current appointment process. 
CGIAR-nominees on center boards. The CGIAR has the responsibility to nominate or appoint a 
number of members to boards of centers. Presently, the Secretariat consults with donors and 
each center as nominees are needed, examines possible candidates in the CIS and makes these 
names available to the center. The candidates selected by the center from among these names 
are forwarded to the CGIAR and confirmed as CGIARdesignated members, unless there is 
objection to their appointment. The Working Group notes that the effectiveness of the current 
process in terms of reinforcing board performance and accountability has not been studied and 
suggests that the Evaluation Committee (recommended above) organize such a study and the 
CGIAR consider any proposals for modification in the process in the light of the findings from 
such a study. 
Review Dane1 members. TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat select the individuals to serve on 
external program and management review panels, in consultation with the centers being reviewed 
and drawing on names in the CIS data base. The two secretariats work closely in screening 
potential candidates, for which there are tested procedures. The Working Group does not see a 
need for change in the current panel member appointment process. 
Members of ad hoc working groups. Ad hoc working groups have come to be an important 
instrument of the CGIAR. They provide an opportunity to give more thorough consideration to 
issues than would be possible in the plenary, save time in the plenary sessions, and provide a 
means for dealing with issues on which consensus is not reached in the course of normal 
discussion (e.g. intellectual property rights, livestock research, banana and plantain research, 
deliberation and decision making, forestry and agroforestry, etc.). 
The Working Group recommends that ad hoc working groups continue to be appointed by the 
CGIAR Chairman, following an approach which systematically aims to: 
0 clarify, in advance, the terms of reference of a working group, before assessing 
willingness of individuals to serve on it; 
0 include members holding a spectrum of views on the issue; 
0 determine, in advance of announcing membership, the willingness of individuals 
to serve; 
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0 include small as well as large donors, developing country as well as 
industrialized, and “newcomers” as well as “old boys”; and, 
0 not unduly concentrate responsibilities on any single individual or delegation. 
DeveloDinP country representatives. The views of developing country agricultural researchers are 
reflected to the CGIAR through the presence of members of TAC (l/2 from developing 
countries), members of center Boards (generally l/2 from developing countries), donor members 
from developing countries (now numbering lo), and the “Fixed Term Representatives.” The 
CGIAR has a continuing concern with the adequacy of these instruments and seeks to improve 
on them. 
Additional opportunities for centers to become appraised of the needs of national agricultural 
researchers exist. Recently, a round table meeting was convened by the Center Directors Sub- 
Committee on Sub-Saharan Africa and facilitated by ISNAR. The meeting, which was held at 
ICRAF in Nairobi, was attended by all center directors and African agricu.ltural research 
collaborators to discuss topics of mutual interest, including the needs of countries for international 
research. In the light of the apparent success of this experience, and comments made by several 
respondents to the questionnaire survey about the inadequacy of the current mechanisms, the 
Working Group recommends that the CGIAR and the centers explore the possibility of using a 
regional roundtable format more systematically for reflecting views of developing country 
agricultural researchers within the CGIAR. Regional roundtables may help identify one or two 
agricultural researchers from each region, who could be invited to attend CGIAR meetings. 
Meetiw Agendas and Svstem Manarrement. The Working Group explored the possibility of 
having a CGIAR-level committee to advise the Chairman on agenda and system management matters. 
It has concluded that a specific standing committee of this kind would be premature at this time. The 
Working Group recognizes that, with two standing committees (on finance and evaluation), the Chairman 
has two key groups to consult on agenda and system management matters. In addition, the Chairman has 
the prerogative to establish an ad hoc working group when there is need for consultation on these matters 
with a wider range of stakeholders. 
Conclusions 
The basic conclusion reached by the Working Group is that it is time for the CGIAR to modify 
some of the ways it has been conducting business through the years. Yet, like most of the donors and 
centers, it believes that the system should attempt to preserve as much of its informal atmosphere as 
possible. Above all, the system should continue to reach its decisions by building consensus, as this is 
one of the attributes of the CGIAR most valued by its members. For this reason, what is recommended 
above on decision making is what the Working Group considers to be a minimal structure for the CGIAR. 
The recommendations made regarding information sharing and deliberation also follow the same 
principle. There is need for greater productivity and efficiency in the way the meetings are organized 
and conducted, not just for fostering the dialogue among donors, centers and developing country 
agriculturists, but also for activating the enormous pool of talent available at the meetings of the CGIAR. 
This will require more discipline on the part of everyone at the meetings and perhaps greater structure, 
but not at the expense of limiting the CGIAR’s opportunity to reach decisions as a committee of the 
whole. 
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The recommendations made in the report have many operational implications. The Working 
Group has given some thought to these matters, but has not specified fill procedures. AIthough 
important, these should not cloud the basic principles and rationale that led to the recommendations. 
Operational matters, on which there are many comments in the replies to the questionnaire survey, will 
need to be worked out with experience, assuming the Group’s acceptance of the principles and rationale 
for the recommendations. 
May 10, 1993 
Attachment 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the 
CGIAR’s Deliberation and Decision Making Processes -- 
Results from a Questionnaire Survey 
of CGIAR Members and Center Managers 
At the CGIAR’s 1992 Mid Term Meeting (MTM) the Chairman established a Working 
Group (WG) to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the CGIAR’s current deliberation and 
decision making processes and develop options for improving these processes. Part of the 
Working Group’s mandate included making suggestions for the organization and conduct of the 
International Centers Week (ICW) 1992. On a trial basis, at the suggestion of the WG, three 
panel discussions (conducted in parallel fashion) were organized on international agricultural 
research needs and means in three sample ecoregions. In addition, the WG presented a draft 
report containing a series of initial thoughts on the organization of future CGIAR meetings and 
on ways the CGIAR could improve its decision making processes. This was discussed by the 
CGIAR in a preliminary fashion at ICW 92. 
Following the ICW, the WG conducted a questionnaire survey of the individuals 
representing various subgroups of the CGIAR, in an effort to gather their views regarding the 
topics being examined by the WG more comprehensively and systematically. This paper 
summarizes the findings from this survey. 
The Survey 
The questionnaire included 32 questions, many with both closed and open-ended 
responses, grouped into four sections covering the following areas: 
Section I: The parallel sessions experiment conducted at ICW 92 and the idea of 
devoting part of future ICWs to discussion of substantive issues of global 
significance 
Section II: The number, focus and location of the meetings of the CGIAR 
Section III: Decision-making in the CGIAR in general terms 
Section IV: Possible changes in the CGIAR’s decision-making structure 
The questionnaire was sent to all CGIAR members, center directors, board chairs and 
TAC members in early December, with a return date of January 20, 1993. As of the end of 
March a total of 48 responses were received (Annex II). Of these, 41 were from CGIAR 
members and centers. These were tabulated for detailed analysis. The remaining responses were 
studied mainly for their content in terms of suggestions made. 
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The 44 responses from the CGIAR members and centers were distributed as follows: 
CGIAR donors (including cosponsors) 19 
Fixed Term Representatives 2 
Center Directors 13 
Board Chairs 7 
Although the number of responding donors is less than half of all donors, their 1992 
contributions represent about three-quarters of all funding for the CGIAR. The views of all but 
two centers are represented in the responses received from the center directors and board chairs. 
To simplify the presentation, in what follows the two responses received from fixed-term 
representatives has been combined with the responses received from the donors (including 
cosponsors), and the responses from the center directors and board chairs are treated as one 
group. (Incidentally, the pattern of responses from the center directors broadly mirror those from 
the board chairs.) 
I. Parallel Sessions 
All but two of the respondents indicated they attended one or more of the panel 
discussions held at ICW 92. The overall impression of the respondents on the experiment 
conducted was generally negative. (Table 1) The most frequent criticisms of the experime,nt 
included the following: 
l lacked focus and clear objectives; 
l not well linked with the business at hand; 
l dominated by panelists from one discipline. 
. 
Table 1. Respondents’ Impressions of the Pa.raIIeI 
Sessions Experiment 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
Negative 55% 55% 55% 
Mixed (positive 
& negative) 45% 45% 45% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
n=20 n=20 n=40 
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However, When asked if they would be in favor of devoting part of future ICWs to 
discussion of substantive issues of global significance (not necessarily organized along 
geographic lines), the respondents were overwhelmingly supportive, (Table 2) However, they 
cautioned that such discussions should not be academic. Instead, they should focus on themes 
of operational significance to the CGIAR. 
Table 2. Support for Devoting Part of Future 
ICWs to Discussion of GIobal Issues 
CGIAR 




80% 89% 85% 
20% 11% 15% 
100% 100% 100% 
-n=20 n=19 n=39 
On the question of how much of the ICW time should be devoted to discussion of 
substantive issues of global significance, the respondents who supported this idea slightly favored 
M day over one day. (Table 3) 
Table 3. Portion of ICW Time to Be Allocated to 
Discussion of Substantive Issues of Global 
Significance 
CGIAR 





44% 65% 54% 
50% 35% 43% 
6% 3% 
100% 1006 100% 
n=lS n=17 n=35 
A substantial majority of the same group of respondents were in favor of using a well- 
organized parallel session format for the discussion of substantive issues of global significance. 
(Table 4) 
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Those favoring a parallel session format made a number of suggestions for topics that could be 
discussed at these sessions in the future. The following are the most frequently mentioned topics 
(with the frequencies of mention in parentheses): 
Ecoregional approach (7) 
Funding of IARCs and NARS (6) 
Natural resource management research/sustainability (5) 
Genetic resources/biodiversity (4) 
Relations with NARS (4) 
Intellectual property rights (3) 
Inter-center collaboration (3) 
Population-food production race (3) 
Prospects for yield gains/yield ceiling (2) 
Relations with NGOs and private sector (2) 
Networking (2) 
Biotechnology (2) 
Research priority setting in the CGIAR (2) 
Other topics mentioned are listed in Annex I. These are included in this report in detail as an 
aid in planning similar sessions in the future. 
II. Information Sharing: 
Meetings of the CGIAR 
The respondents were overwhelmingly supportive of the “two CGIAR meetings a year” 
model that is currently in use. (Table 5) 
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Table 5. Support for Having Two CGIAR Meetings 
Each Year 
CGIAR 




95% 88% 92% 
5 12% 8% 
100% 100% 100% 
n=21 n=17 n=38 
They were similarly supportive of providing separate general foci to the ICW and the 
MTM, such as devoting the ICW to more system-wide issues and the MTM to center-specific 
issues. (Table 6) They cautioned, however, that this principle could not be followed rigidly. For 
example,. discussion ‘of important CGIAR business, such as external reviews, should not be 
delayed in order to stick rigidly to a principle. 
Table 6. Support for Having Separate Generai Foci 
for the ICW and the MTM 
CGIAR 




91% 89% 90% 
9 11% 10% 
100% 100% 100% 
n=21 n=19 n=40 
While most of the respondents were in favor of devoting the ICW more to system-wide 
issues and the MTM more to center-specific concerns, other suggestions and cautionary 
comments were also made: 
l The ICW is most suitable for addressing system issues. The MTM could focus on more 
specific topics, with emphasis on decision-making. . 
l The ICW could focus on “the ‘substance’ of centers’ progress and reminder of major 
development issues, leaving the MTM for internal process matters.” 
l “The MTM should be devoted more to policy and system-wide issues. ICW should 
continue to be the “general” meeting.” 
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l “MTM should be devoted to center-specific and region-specific issues” -- including 
“presentations from NARS and donors on their concerns.” 
l The budget approval process would have to be handled at the ICW, even if center- 
specific business is shifted to the MTM. 
Regarding the location of future MTMs (following the Puerto Rico meeting in 1993), almost 
all respondents favored the idea of holding them at the CGIAR centers, or at least the countries 
hosting CGIAR centers. (Table 7) Those favoring the idea highlighted the importance for the 
donors of seeing developing country and center conditions firsthand. The few who were not 
supportive noted that the MTM could serve as an important event for generating awareness and 
increasing support for the CGIAR in current and potential future donor countries. 
While there was broad support for a developing country location for the MTM, there was 
also wide recognition that few IARCs have the facilities to hold such meetings. (“It may be more 
feasible to hold the meeting in the capital or a large city (with trips to the center, rather than at 
the center as such.“) One respondent suggested a co-organization format between the CGIAR 
center and the country hosting the center. 
Table 7. Support for HoIding Future MTMs at 
CGIAR Centers or Countries Hosting 
CGIqR Centers 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
. 
In favor 90% 94% 
Against ‘. 10% 6% 
Total 100% 100% 
n=19 n=16 
III. Decision-Making - 
Whv Do Donors ParticiDate 






The WG attempted to understand the key motivation of the donor members of the CGIAR 
(including the cosponsors) to participate in the meetings of the CGIAR. This was probed through 
a question requesting the donors to indicate their “primary” and “secondary” motivation for 
attending the CGIAR meetings. (Table 8) 
7 




To become updated on CGIAR 18% 34% 
matters 
To consult with others in order 3% 55% 
to facilitate my own agency’s 
decision-making 
To contribute to decision-making 80% 11% 
by the CGIAR 
Total 101% 100% 
n=19 n=19 
A clear message emerging from Table 8 is that the most important reason for the donors 
to participate is to contribute to decision-making by the CGIAR. Four-fifths of the donors 
indicated that this was their primary motivation, suggesting that they see the CGIAR more as 
a decision-making forum than a setting for consultation and deliberation. The more passive (and 
selfish) role of “consulting with others in order to facilitate my own agency’s decision-making” 
was chosen by only 3 percent of :the donors as their primary motivation.. This was chosen, 
though, as the most significant secondary motivation for participating in the meetings of the 
CGIAR. 
Satisfaction with Current Deliberation 
and Decision-Making Processes 
There was a strong indication from the respondents that they are not generally satisfied with 
the CGIAR’s current deliberation and decision-making processes. (Table 9) 
Table 9. Satisfaction with the CGIAR’s Current 
Deliberation and Decision-Making 
Processes 
CGIAR 




20% 25% 22% 
80% 75% 78% 
100% 100% 100% 
n=15 n=12 n=27 
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The respondents were asked to elaborate by indicating what they saw as the key advantages 
and disadvantages of the CGIAR’s current processes. Content analysis of their responses indicate 
the following to be the key factors (numbers in parentheses indicate frequencies of mention): 
Advantages: 
equal voice regardless of 
contribution/opportunity to participate (15) 
informality, flexibility, pragmatism (13) 
consensus mode of decision- 
making/consensus building process (11) 
TAC advice/review procedures (6) 
efficient use of time/well-prepared 
documentation (5) 
transparency/openness (3) 
opportunity to consult others (3) 
minimum pal itization (3) 
independence of centers and donors (1) 
Ad Hoc Task Forces 
Disadvantages 
inefficient use of time/lengthy discussions 
(18) 
difficult to make hard decisions (11) 
too many participants/speakers in plenary 
sessions/too much time spent in passive 
listening (11) 
dominance of/too much dependence on TAC 
(7) 
rapidly changing mix of participants/uneven 
competence of donor representatives to 
discuss issues (7) 
immature papers/recommendations not 
always well-justified (6) 
poor participation by NARS (and also NGOs 
and the private sector) (5) 
success of meeting is chairman dependent (5) 
little opportunity for centers to participate in 
discussions (5) 
discussion superficial and not probing/show- 
and-tell by the centers (5) 
poor budget decisions (4) 
decisions made by few major donors (1) 
small non-core donors have too large a voice 
(1) 
members do not have to support decisions 
with dollars (1) 
decision making is left to the Secretariat (1) 
The CGIAR often establishes ad hoc task forces or working groups on specific issues 
requiring decision by the CGIAR (such as the WG which prepared this report). The respondents 
were asked to indicate if they were generally satisfied with the way appointments are presently 
made to such ad hoc task forces. (Table 10) 
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Table 10. Satisfaction With the Way Appointments 
Are Made to Ad Hoc Task Forces 
CGIAR 




69% 67% 68% 
2% 33% 2% 
100% 100% 100% 
n=16 n=9 n=25 
Although two-thirds of the respondents indicated they were generally satisfied with the way 
appointments are made, several suggestions were made to improve the process, even by those 
who indicated satisfaction with the present mode. These included the following: 
current process unclear; should be made more transparent (4) 
potential members of such ud hoc task forces should be proposed by CGIAR 
members (4) 
there is need for wider canvassing/should avoid “club within a club” (4) 
. - TOR and profile of task force should be prepared beforehand 
there should be less “tokenism” 
task force “should not be used as an escape mechanism or TAC by-passing 
device” 
The WG also inquired with each responding delegation the maximum number of persons 
they would be able to assign to ad hoc committee work outside of the CGIAR meetings and the 
maximum time each person could devote to such CGIAR work. 15 donor members responded 
to this question. Their responses ranged from “one person for one week” to “four persons for 
about a month each.” The median number of persons indicated by these 15 donors was 2, with 
average maximum time of about 2 weeks per person. The maximum overall effort that could be 
afforded by these 15 donors was about 1.5 person-years. 
Workiw Sub-Grows 
Many of the decisions made by the CGIAR fall into a number of regularly recurring areas, 
such as those relating to nominations, programs and budgets, external reviews, and priorities and 
strategies. In the draft report presented at the last ICW, the WG raised as an option the 
establishment of a set of working sub-groups to consider issues and make recommendations to 
the full CGIAR in these regularly recurring areas. In the survey, the WG explored if the 
respondents were inclined to consider the establishment of one or more such CGIAR-level 
working sub-groups. (Table 11) 
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Table 11. Support for Establishing Working Sub-Groups 
CGIAR . 
Members Centers Total 
Inclined to support 56% 93% 72% 
Inclined not to support 44% 2% 28% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
n=l8 n=14 n&32 
While more than half of the responding CGIAR members and all but one of the responding 
center directors/chairs were inclined to ‘support the establishment of one or more working sub- 
groups, support for sub-groups in specific areas differed widely (see Section IV, below). 
Some Means of Improving the 
Efficiency of CGIAR Meetiws 
The WG probed the respondents about their views on: 
- optional ways of balancing demand and supply for time at the ICW and the MTM; 
- identifying specific donors for opening the discussion on certain agenda items; 
- allowing donors to indicate to the Secretariat the items they wish to address at length. 
On balancing demand and supply for time, the respondents were given a hypothetical 
situation (time required to conduct the regular business of the Group exceeds that available under 
current arrangements for the ICW and MTM) and asked to indicate their preference for one of 
five alternatives. (Table 12) 
Table 12. Options for Balancing Demand and Supply for Time at 
CGIAR Meetings* 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
Add more days to ICW and MTM 
Add more hours (e.g., evening 
sessions to each day 
Reduce the time for presentations 
of each item 
Reduce the time for questions/ 
discussion of each item 



















l n = number of choices made by the respondents. 
Totals may not equal 100% because of rounding. 
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The option that received the greatest support from both groups of respondents was to reduce 
the time for presentations of each item. (“Take the discussion of EPR/EMRs: presentation by 
chairman of panel, TAC, chairman of board, director general, responses by panel, board, 
director general, etc.“) There was practically no support for holding three meetings per year. 
Support for the remaining options was about the same. As most respondents chose more than 
one option, in their comments they stressed the need to use several of these options 
simultaneously. In addition, they made a number of suggestions, including the following: 
- establish working sub-groups/standing committees (6) 
- reduce the number of items for the plenary (3) 
- prepare more concise papers (2) 
- use modem information technology to handle some items (e.g., centers to videotape their 
presentations; interaction by telefax) (2) 
- more executive sessions 
- have coordinated response from groups of donors on each issue 
- organize concurrent sessions 
- “abolish the present system of “lectures” by center directors, and start with discussion 
immediately. ” 
Over half of the CGIAR members were opposed to identifying ce.rtain donors in advance 
of the meeting to have special responsibility for opening the discussion on each item. Center 
directors and board chairs, however, were generally supportive of the idea. (Table 13) 
Table 13. Support for Arranging to Have Certain 
Donors Open Discussion of an Agenda 
Item 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
Supportive 42% 79% 58% 
Not supportive 3% 21% 42% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
n=l9 n=l4 n=33 
Those supporting the idea pointed out that, as the responsibility for canvassing delegations 
to ascertain individual interests rests with the Secretariat, it could make suggestions to the 
Chairman about alternative arrangements for handling each item. Those against the idea pointed 
out that such a practice could lead to promotion of power groups and may not be politically 
acceptable. 
There was greater support for having the donors indicate to the Secretariat the agenda items, 
if any, they wish to address at length. (Table 14) Several respondents indicated that this 
opportunity exists at present anyway. Nevertheless, several suggestions were made for improving 
the process: 
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Table 14. Support for Having Donors Indicate Items 
They Wish to Address at Length 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
Supportive 74% 86% 79% 
Not supportive 26% 14% 21% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
n=l9 n=l4 n=33 
- “there must also be a discipline system” 
- “could distort the discussion unless the Secretariat could refuse lengthy interventions” 
- “should be done well in advance” 
- “address ‘at length’ should be avoided” 
- “we need less ‘statements”‘. 
IV. Decision-Making Structure 
The WG probed the views of the respondents about the perceived needs for some kind of 
a committee or working-group structure in each of six key reguIarly-recurring areas of CGIAR 
decision making. Table 15 illustrates, in a composite fashion, the responses to several questions 
in the survey instrument. 
Table 15. Perceived Need for CGIAR-Level Sub-Groups in Specific Areas 
(percentage of respondents indicating need) 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
% n % n % n 
Nominations 47 15 62 13 54 28 
Program and budget 75 16 69 16 72 32 
External reviews 50 16 25 16 38 32 
Priorities and strategies 56 16 73 15 65 31 
Agenda and system management 43 14 63 16 53 30 
Public awareness and fund raising 54’ 13 88 16 72 29 
Other areas 0 15 23 13 11 28 
Several conclusions can be reached from the percentages in Table 15: 
l There was stron perceived need for a CGIAR-level committee or working group in one 
area: programs and budgets. Three quarters of the CGIAR members and over two-thirds 
of center managers supported having such a committee. 
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CGIAR members were most lukewarm toward a committee addressing agenda setting and 
system management concerns and one concerned with nominations. They were about 
evenly split on the need for committees in the other three areas that were identified: 
external reviews, priorities and strategies, public awareness and fund raising. 
The centers showed support for having CGIAR-level committees in all areas except 
external reviews. They expressed very strong need for committees on public awareness 
and fund raising, priorities and strategies, and program and budget matters. 
The respondents saw no need for any other committees than the ones identified 
WG. 
by the 
. Comments of the respondents on specific functional areas are summarized in the sections 
below. 
Nominations 
Generally speaking, CGIAR members were not in favor of introducing a new structure for 
search and nomination tasks regarding appointments the CGIAR needs to make decisions on. 
One respondent commented that “donor representatives are less well acquainted with potential 
candidates than are the Secretariat and TAC.” Most comments centered on appointments to 
specific bodies: 
- “a more transparent mechanism is needed for appointments to working groups;” 
- “why wouldn’t the board appointments handled by the Secretariat be more effective?” 
- “I am not pleased with regional representation or other input from the outside...” 
- “CGIAR members and co-sponsors should be involved .in the nomination process for 
TAC and center boards.” 
Resource Allocation Process 
Most of the comments provided further justification for the perceived need for a working 
sub-group to consider TAC’s recommendations on programs and budgets in greater detail: 
- “The CGIAR review of center program and .budget proposals at ICW is practically 
nonexistent. This is a long standing gap in the budget process and needs to be filled. The 
idea could be to complement and supplement the current TAC process by providing a 
somewhat different perspective.” 
- “TAC’s responsibility is to provide independent recommendations, and it should therefore 
not participate in the actual decision-making process. ” 
- “The presence or absence of a CGIAR work group on programs and budgets may have 
little impact on resource allocation under current tight budget circumstances. At no time 
in the history of the CGIAR have the donors been in greater control of center budget 
levels.. .A donor dominated program and budget work group could influence how some 
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donors would allocate their resources. ” 
- “We should ensure that TAC can carry out these tasks effectively. Otherwise we create 
- duplication of efforts and may undermine the credibility of TAC. ” 
- “For four years in a row resource allocation has been mechanical, non-imaginative, 
unfair, demoralizing, etc.” 
External Review Process 
The respondents from the centers were by and large satisfied with the current process. A 
dissenting voice among the centers noted that the “centers deserve the full CGIAR!” 
One donor in favor of having a working group in this area noted that “some of the recent 
reviews have been quite uneven in their analysis of the centers... ‘The CGIAR and TAC 
Secretariat members should play a role in seeing that the. teams are not unduly influenced by the 
center directors’ reactions to their drafts.” 
Priority SettinP and 
StratePv Formulation 
One donor was skeptical about donor involvement in this area: “I am not certain that busy 
donor representatives who would serve on a work group for a few days a year would provide 
any better judgments than we are now receiving from TAC.” Another saw a major need: 
“Strategy formulation is a key area in which the CGIAIUTAC system is in a logjam.” 
Respondents from the centers emphasized the need for more involvement of other parts of the 
system -- in particular the NARS and the centers. 
Three donors noted that there was a need for a CGIAR-level working group, but only on 
an ad hoc basis. One saw a need for one “in view of the present situation., .but not in the longer 
run.” Another noted that an ad hoc group could be “puiled together every five years or so when 
. the priorities and strategies are redone by TAC.” 
Meetinp Agendas and 
System Management 
A working group in this area was the least supported by the donors (and next-to-least by 
the centers) among the six areas covered in the survey. Some respondents were unsure if this 
sub-group would function as an executive committee. 
Some respondents emphasized better use of existing mechanisms: the Secretariat canvassing 
donors and centers about items for the agenda and the Chairman using the cosponsors better. 
One respondent highlighted the need for such a committee “with the rather frequent changes in 
chairmanship. ” 
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Several donors pointed out that a permanent structure might not be necessary. “It might be 
useful to have an occasional London-type conference (with some rotation in membership).” 
Public Awareness 
and Fund Raising 
Respondents from the centers noted that the challenges faced by the CGIAR in this area are 
great and that the activities led by the center directors are insufficient to meet the challenges. 
“Competence in the CGIAR Secretariat is important in this area.” “Important for donors to be 
enlisting other donors in support of the CGIAR.” 
Donor respondents, on the other hand, noted the existence of PARC and PAA and, at best, 
saw a need for an ad hoc working group. 
ComDosition of 
Sub-Grouts 
In addition to probing the areas in which the CGIAR may wish to establish working sub- 
groups to facilitate its decision making, the WG sought the respondents’ views on the possible 
composition of these sub-groups. (Table 16) 
Responding CGIAR members were generally supportive of sub-groups being composed of 
CGIAR members -- close to half indicated a preference for this. Center directors and board 
chairs, on the other hand, preferred arrangements which allow their own participation in sub- 
groups. A third of all respondents preferred options other than the ones provided as examples, 
encouraging flexibility in the membership arrangements and arguing that the composition of the 
groups should depend on their specific TOR. Thus, in some cases it would be more suitable for 
center representatives to participate not as members, but as resource people or advisors. One 
participant argued that the title fixed-term representative should be changed to “developing 
country representative” and should be selected differently from the current system. 
Table 16. Views on the Composition of CGIAR-Level 
Working Sub-Groups 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
A. Donor members of the CGIAR 13% 6% 9% 
B. A + Fixed Term Representatives 27% 13% 
C. B+TAC members 13% 6% 9% 
D. C+Center boards 12% 6% 
E. D+Center management 20% 35% 28% 
F. Other (please specify) 27% 41% 34% 
Total 100% 100% 99% 
n=15 n=17 n=32 
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On the question of how the membership of the sub-groups should be determined, the 
respondents were about evenly split in their opinions. Close to half argued for the Chairman 
appointing the members of the sub-groups after informal consultation with various constituencies. 
A slightly more favored having each constituency elect or nominate its own representatives. 
Other selection models were also proposed, One respondent argued that the CGIAR should 
appoint only the chair of the sub-group, this chair then should have a major say in identification 
of participants. Another made a case for a CGIAR Search Committee making recommendations 
from among nominees from each constituency. 
Role of Comonsors 
The WG sought the views of the respondents on the role the cosponsors could/should play 
in the CGIAR’s decision-making process if the CGIAR-level sub-groups were to be established 
in one or more of the areas covered above. Close to three-fourths of all respondents expressed 
their views on this question. Of these, about half favored maintaining the current arrangements, 
with possibly some added responsibility for the cosponsors. (Chairing sub-groups or serving ex- 
oflcio as members of all sub-groups were mentioned as alternatives by two respondents.) 
The remaining half indicated that they did not see the cosponsors playing any particular role 
if some CGIAR-level sub-groups were to be established, Statements like “they should be 
regarded as other donors” or “just one of the players” summarized the sentiments of this group 
of respondents. One respondent pointed out that the cosponsors “might play a role in advising 
the CGIXR Chair, if he would like, on issues relating to the areas discussed above which are 
not covered by sub-groups (e.g., the agenda). ” 
ODeration of 
Sub-Groups 
The WG solicited the views of the respondents on how working sub-groups could operate 
if the CGIAR were to decide to establish some. Four specific aspects of sub-group operations 
were probed: 
l how frequently the composition of the sub-groups could change; 
l if the sub-groups should meet only during the weeks allocated to the ICW and MTM; 
l if it wished to do so, could a donor member have members in more than one sub-group; 
l specific suggestions on how a sub-group could operate. 
On the frequency of change, half the donors and two-thirds of the centers recommended 
change about every two years. (Table 17) Several respondents suggested staggered membership, 
such as half the membership changing every year. Some stressed the importance of maintaining 
institutional memory and continuity, others noted that questions of change should be handled on 
a case by case basis depending on the requirements of each sub-group, 
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Table 17. Recommended Frequency of Change in 
the Composition of Sub-Groups 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
Once a year 7% 13% 10% 
Every two years 50% 67% 59% 
Every three years or more 43% 20% 31% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
n=14 n=15 n=29 
Regarding meeting times for the sub-groups, most of the respondents felt that part of the 
ICW and MTM should be allocated to sub-group meetings, but that each sub-group should 
decide if it wishes to meet any other time. (Table 18) Some of the respondents made a plea for 
maximum use of electronic means of communication among sub-group members. 
Table 18. Suggested Meeting Times for Sub-Groups 
CGIAR 
Members Centers Total 
Yes, a part of the ICW and MTM 
should be allocated to Sub-Group 
meetings and Sub-Groups should 
meet at no other time 19% 6% 
Yes, a @art of the ICW and MTM 
should be allocated to Sub-Group 
meetings, but each Sub-Group should 
decide if it wishes to meet at any . 
other time 50% 








On the third question noted above, the respondents were quite supportive of allowing donors 
to have members in more than one sub-group. 67 percent of the responding CGIAR members 
and 93 percent of the center directors/board chairs backed this option. In the words of one 
respondent: “to do otherwise could deny the system of the services of some highly talented 
individuals and would provide a deadening impact of formalization and of rules.” Suggestions 
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made included providing a maximum (such as two), imposing conditions, and encouraging 
“smaller donors to get together to insure representation on most committees.” 
The following were among the key suggestions made on the operation of the sub-groups: 
- “They should provide a review and advisory function and not attempt decision-making 
8for the CGIAR. They should attempt a wider, deeper and more rigorous analysis than 
is possible in CGIAR meetings.” 
- As far as possible, they should operate by using telefax and electronic ma.il. 
- There should be a requirement for written reports to be made to the CGIAR at least 
annually. 
- Recommendations should be brought to the full group, along with some brief 
justification. 
- “They should inform other CGTAR members about the agenda and invite them to attend 
(their meetings) with one representative -- if they so wish.” 
Other Suaestions 
The WG invited the respondents to make suggestions for improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of CGIAR’s deliberation and decision-making processes. Several respondents 
highlighted the fact that the changes that have been proposed have implications for the operation 
of TAC and of the two secretariats and suggested that their future roles should also be examined. 
Other key points made included the following: 
- The CGIAR needs to “confirm its relevance in a changing world context: aid cuts, 
Eastern Europe, Agenda 21. ” 
- “The solution to the problems of the CGIAR Iies in working more efficientIy within 
current time constraints rather than throwing a lot more valuable time and effort at the 
system. ” 
- “It is hoped that TAC will be able to -- because of the new budget process -- reduce its 
involvement in financial issues and to increase its involvement with technical issues.” 
Also, “TAC membership might be reduced and increasing use made of ad hoc expert 
panels. ” “TAC’s role as a strategic think tank should be reinforced.” 
- “The CGIAR’s decision-making structure works only if all the players in the game live 
up to their role. As the number of centers and donors has increased, a more structured 
procedure and a number of additional rules and criteria are needed to maintain the 
present informal system through which the CG operates.” 
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- “The most important change needed to improve the CGIAR decision-making process is 
to increase the awareness and knowledge of CGIAR donor representatives as to what the 
system does and what it should do.” 
- “The quality of the system will depend mostly on the quality of the centers. There is a 
need for harmonizing the operations of the centers and creating a strong sense of 
cohesiveness and joint responsibility. The Center Directors Committee is making some 
progress, but the process could be further enhanced. We might have to study ways to 
enhance feedback from NARS into the decision-making process. This may further 
complicate the system, but more openness is essential to enhance confidence.” 
- “The best solution would be a chair and a strong executive committee. Since that solution 
won’t be accepted, a series of working committees seems the next best alternative. 
Somehow the centers must be brought into the decision-making processes, and small 
enough groups must be created to provide for real exchanges, not just set speeches.” 
- “The best brains in the system sit in the 3rd or 4th rows at CGIAR meetings! The Chair 
should call on centers, particularly their DGs, for contributions from the floor a bit more 
(but recognizing it’s a donors’ party.)” 
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Responses and/or communication from the following individuals were also considered (but not included 
in statistical results): T. Henzell (TAC), M. Arnold (TAC-retired), G. Gryseels (TAC Secretariat), Jean- 
Pierre Jacqmotte (CGIAR Secretariat), A. Pritchard, F. Vicariot, and D. Tribe. 
